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Abstract
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary
game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biologi-
cal, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new ap-
proach to evaluate ESS in symmetric two player games with fuzzy payoffs.
Particularly, every strategy is assigned a fuzzy membership that describes
to what degree it is an ESS in presence of uncertainty. The fuzzy set of
ESS characterize the nature of ESS. The proposed approach avoids loss
of any information that happens by the defuzzification method in games
and handles uncertainty of payoffs through all steps of finding an ESS.
We use the satisfaction function to compare fuzzy payoffs, and adopts the
fuzzy decision rule to obtain the membership function of the fuzzy set of
ESS. The theorem shows the relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy Nash
equilibrium. The numerical results illustrate the proposed method is an
appropriate generalization of ESS to fuzzy payoff games.
Keywords: Fuzzy set, game theory, evolutionarily stable strategy, Nash equi-
librium.
1 Introduction
The general problem of how to make decisions plays an important role in eco-
nomics, biology, political science, computer science and etc. Generally in real
life problems, there are several decision makers who affects the actions of the
others. Game theory is the study of mathematical models of conflict and coop-
eration between rational decision-makers. A normal game consists of a set of
players (decision makers), their strategies (actions), and payoffs available for all
combinations of the players’ strategies. Classical game theory [1, 2] deals with
rational players that are engaged in a game with other players. Each player has
to decide among his strategies in order to maximize his payoff, which depends
on the strategies chosen by other players who in turn try to maximize their
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payoffs. However, rationality is generally a strong assumption imposed to real
world scenarios. As a result, evolutionary game theory [3, 4] (EGT) deals with
a population of players, in which players are not assumed to play rationally,
with rationality replaced by evolutionary stability. The players in EGT are re-
peatedly drawn from a random infinite population to play the game. The aim
is to study the evolution of the different strategies in the population according
to a behavioral pattern.
The main concept in EGT is that of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
[5] describing the stable state of a population resulting from dynamics of evo-
lution. Such a strategy is robust to evolutionary selection forces in an exact
sense. Initially all individuals play the same incumbent strategy, then a small
population share of individuals who play some other mutant strategy is injected.
The incumbent strategy is said to be an ESS, if for each mutant strategy, there
exists a positive invasion barrier such that if the population share of mutants
falls below this barrier, the incumbents earns a higher expected payoff than the
mutants. Consequently incumbents have no incentive to change their strategy,
and the mutants have an incentive to return to the incumbent strategy.
To use game theory methods in real world problems, the exact values of
the payoffs should be known. However, since the players usually encounter
uncertainties and their information is incomplete, the crisp values of the payoffs
are usually unknown. Hence the need arises as to study the games with uncertain
payoffs. A way to deal with uncertainties associated with payoffs is to use the
concept of fuzzy sets. Initially, fuzzy sets were introduced by Butnariu [6, 7]
in non-cooperative game theory to model fuzzy games. Many studies on fuzzy
game theory have been reported in the literature [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. The
readers can refer to [15] for the survey on fuzzy game theory. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there isn’t any study reported dealing with uncertainties
in EGT. Particularly, in this paper, we propose the concept of Fuzzy ESS in
symmetric two player games with fuzzy payoffs. In this regards, instead of
answering whether a strategy is an ESS or not, each strategy is assigned a
membership that describes the degree to which it possess the characteristics of
ESS. The idea of fuzzy ESS captures the nature of ESS in a fuzzy payoff game,
and can be considered as a refinement of fuzzy Nash equilibrium proposed in
[11, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Specifically, we show that the fuzzy set of ESS is a subset
of the fuzzy set of Nash equilibrium in symmetric two player games.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related concepts in EGT. The proposed approach to evaluate ESS in games
with fuzzy payoffs is introduced in this section. It also contains the relation
between the proposed fuzzy ESS and the fuzzy Nash equilibrium. In section
3, we illustrate the proposed method by simple examples with small number of
strategies. In section 4, concluding remarks are given and main findings of the
paper are highlighted.
2
2 Evolutionary Stable Strategies: A Fuzzy Gen-
eralization Scheme
A normal game consists of a set of players, their strategies, and the payoffs
available for all combinations of players strategies. A strategic game G can be
defined as
G1 = (N, (Si), ($i)), (1)
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of n players, Si denotes the set of strategies
available to the ith player and $i :
∏
j∈N Sj → R is the payoff function of the
ith player (
∏
j∈N Sj is the set of all possible combination of strategies). In
economics, the payoffs are usually firms’ profits or consumers’ utilities, while in
biology, payoffs usually represent individual fitness.
For a symmetric two-player game, i.e. N = {1, 2}, the two players have the
same strategy set S = {s1, s2, . . . , s|S|}, namely S1 = S2 = S, where |S| denotes
the cardinality of S. For any i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|}, the payoff for the player 1
playing si facing the oponent playing sj is the same as the payoff for the player
2 playing si facing the oponent playing sj , i.e. $1(si, sj) = $2(sj , si). Hence the
payoffs of the both players can be described using the same function $. If the
player 1 plays si and the player 2 plays sj , the payoffs are $(si, sj) to Player 1
and $(sj , si) to Player 2. Thus a symmetric two-player game G can be defined
by
G = (S, $). (2)
where $ can be represented by a |S| × |S| payoff matrix.
For the simplicity of the notation, in the remainder of this paper, the index of
a strategy is used to represent the strategy itself. For instance, $(i, j) represents
$(si, sj).
2.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
In this subsection, we review briefly the main concepts and definitions in EGT.
Definition 1 [3]: For a symmetric two-player game G, a strategy si ∈ S is
an ESS if for every j 6= i, there exists εij ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1− ε) · $(i, i) + ε · $(i, j) > (1 − ε) · $(j, i) + ε · $(j, j) (3)
holds when ε ∈ (0, εij).
Suppose that a population of individuals that plays strategy si, is invaded
by a group of mutants that play the alternative strategy sj . Equation 3 requires
that regardless of the choice of sj , an incumbent’s expected payoff (left hand side
of the inequality) from a random match in the post-entry population exceeds
that of a mutant (right hand side of the inequality) so long as the size of the
invading group ε is smaller than the invasion barrier εij . A lower invasion
barrier means that the population is more vulnerable to invasion, while a higher
invasion barrier means that the population is more stable.
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For instance, consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game that is a well-known
symmetric 2 × 2 game, representing the conflict between individual rationality
and social optimality. For this game, S = {C,D}, where C denotes “Cooperate”
and D denotes “Defect”. The payoffs satisfy $(D,C) > $(C,C) > $(D,D) >
$(C,D). According to definition 1, one can show that the strategy D is an ESS.
Hence, a player tends to defect rather than to cooperate.
2.2 Fuzzy Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
In this subsection, we generalize the ESS in games with fuzzy payoffs. In par-
ticular, a symmetric two-player game with fuzzy payoffs is similar to crips one
except that the payoffs are fuzzy numbers, i.e.
G = (S, $˜). (4)
where $˜ shows the set of fuzzy payoffs.
When the payoffs are not crisp values, the expected payoffs for the players
have uncertainties. In this regard, the expected payoff of an incumbent playing
strategy i against a mutant playing strategy j is a fuzzy number
E˜ijI (ε) = (1− ε) · $˜(i, i) + ε · $˜(i, j), (5)
Similarly, the expected payoff for the mutant is
E˜ijM (ε) = (1− ε) · $˜(j, i) + ε · $˜(j, j). (6)
Now, to compute the fuzzy expected values for the players, the multiplication
and addition can be done using the extension principle [20]:
µλ·A(x) = µA(
x
λ
), (7)
µA+B(z) = sup
x+y=z
min(µA(x), µB(y)), (8)
where A,B are fuzzy numbers, and λ ∈ R \ {0}.
However, the question is how to compare fuzzy expexted payoffs. There are
several different methods for comparing possibilistic distributions in the context
of fuzzy set theory. In this paper, in order to compare fuzzy numbers E˜ijI (ε) and
E˜ijM (ε), we used the satisfaction function [21]. The satisfaction function is the
truth value for comparison between fuzzy values. In particular, the satisfaction
function for the comparison between fuzzy values A and B is defined as
SF (A > B) =
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
y
µA(x)⊙ µB(y)dxdy∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞
µA(x) ⊙ µB(y)dxdy
, (9)
SF (A < B) =
∫∞
−∞
∫ y
−∞
µA(x) ⊙ µB(y)dxdy∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞
µA(x) ⊙ µB(y)dxdy
, (10)
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where ⊙ is a T-norm operator that can be the min operator, multiplication, and
etc. In this paper, we use multiplication operator as the T-norm to simplify the
calculations.
SF (A > B) represents the possibility that A is larger than B, while SF (A <
B) represents the possibility that A is smaller than B. Clearly, SF (A > B) +
SF (A < B) = 1, and SF (A > A) = 0.5.
Although some restrictions on A,B are necessary [21], most types of fuzzy
sets in different applications, such as triangular and trapezoidal, satisfy the
imposed restrictions.
Now, by using the satisfaction function, the following relation represents the
degree to which Equation 3 is satisfied
µij(ε¯) = inf
ε∈(0,ε¯)
SF (E˜ijI (ε) > E˜
ij
M (ε)). (11)
In addition, by applying Bellman and Zadeh’s fuzzy decision rule [22], we de-
fine the degree of resistibility of si against sj as the supremum of the intersection
of µij and the invasion barrier ε¯, i.e.
rij = sup
ε¯
min(µij(ε¯), ε¯). (12)
Finally, the fuzzy ESS set S˜ can be defined as
µS˜(i) = min
j 6=i
rij . (13)
The membership function value µS˜(i) describes the degree to which the strategy
si possesses the characteristic of ESS. The strategies can be ranked according
to their membership. Strategies with a higher membership are evolutionarily
stronger than those with a lower membership.
2.3 Relation between Fuzzy ESS and Fuzzy Nash Equilib-
rium
In this subsection, the relation between the proposed generalization of the ESS
and fuzzy Nash equilibrium [11] is studied. In this regard, we review the Nash
equilibrium concept and its fuzzy generalization, as in the following.
The concept of Nash equilibrium [2] is a cornerstone of non-cooperative game
theory. A strategy combination is called a Nash equilibrium (NE), if no player
can do better by unilaterally changing his strategy. In other words, every player
adopts his best response to the strategies of the other players.
Definition 2: For a strategic game G = (N, (Si), ($i)), a strategy combina-
tion (s∗1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) ∈
∏
j∈N Sj is a NE if for every i ∈ N and every si 6= s
∗
i ∈ Si,
$i(s
∗
1 . . . s
∗
i . . . s
∗
n) > $i(s
∗
1 . . . s
∗
i−1, si, s
∗
i+1 . . . s
∗
n) (14)
.
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For instance, (D,D) is the unique NE in prisoner’s dilemma game, and is
also called a symmetric NE because of the symmetry of the strategy pair.
In [11], the authors proposed an interesting approach on finding degree of
being NE of each strategy combination in fuzzy payoff games. Specifically,
each strategy combination (s1, s2, . . . , sn) has a possibility of being NE with the
degree
µNash(s1, . . . , sn) = min
∀i∈N
(
min
∀s
′
i
6=si∈Si
(
SF ($˜i(s1 . . . si . . . sn)
> $˜i(s1 . . . si−1, s
′
i, si+1 . . . xn)
))
. (15)
Although ESS and NE were proposed in quite different settings, there exists
a well established relation between ESS and symmetric NE in symmetric two-
player games. That is, the symmetric NE set contains the ESS set [4]. In this
paper, we show that there is a similar relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy
symmetric NE, as follows.
Theorem 1: In a symmetric two-player fuzzy game G, the fuzzy symmetric
NE set contains the fuzzy ESS set, i.e. for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|},
µNash(si, si) > µS˜(si). (16)
Proof : According to Equation. (15),
µNash(si, si) =min
(
min
j 6=i
SF
(
$˜1(si, si) > $˜1(sj , si)
)
,
min
j 6=i
SF
(
$˜2(si, si) > $˜2(si, sj)
))
=min
(
min
j 6=i
SF
(
$˜(si, si) > $˜(sj , si)
)
,
min
j 6=i
SF
(
$˜(si, si) > $˜(sj , si)
))
=min
j 6=i
SF
(
$˜(si, si) > $˜(sj , si)
)
. (17)
According to Equations 11,12 and 13,
µS˜(si) =min
j 6=i
sup
ε¯
min( inf
ε∈(0,ε¯)
SF (E˜ijI (ε) > E˜
ij
M (ε)), ε¯)
6min
j 6=i
sup
ε¯
inf
ε∈(0,ε¯)
SF (E˜ijI (ε) > E˜
ij
M (ε))
=min
j 6=i
SF (E˜ijI (0) > E˜
ij
M (0))
=min
j 6=i
SF ($˜(si, si) > $˜(sj , si)). (18)
Thus
µNash(si, si) > µS˜(si). (19)
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a-b a a+b
1
Figure 1: The membership function of a symmetric triangular fuzzy number
T (a, b)

As a result, the proposed fuzzy set of ESS can be considered as a refinement
of the concept of fuzzy NE in [11].
3 Numerical Results
In this section, we present two examples to illustrate the proposed approach.
Specifically, in [11], a two-player game with fuzzy payoffs were used to evaluate
the fuzzy Nash equilibrium. The row player’s payoffs of that game are collected
in Table 1, and is considered as the first example of a symmetric two-player
game. The column player’s payoffs are collected in Table 2, and is considered
as the second example. For instance, for the firsr exaple, the payoff of a player
when he plays s1 and his oponent plays s2 is $˜(1, 2) = T (6, 1). T (a, b) denotes a
symmetric triangular fuzzy number with the center on a and boundaries on a±b.
Fig. 1 shows the membership function of T (a, b). Multiplication and addition
involving symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers using the extension principle are
considerably simplified. Let T (a, b) and T (a′, b′) be two symmetric triangular
fuzzy numbers, and c be a positive real number. Then
c · T (a, b) = T (ca, cb), (20)
T (a, b) + T (a′, b′) = T (a+ a′, b+ b′). (21)
Hence the expected payoffs E˜ijI (ε) and E˜
ij
M (ε) in Eq. (5) and (6) are also
symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers.
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the first example
$˜(i, j) s1 s2 s3
s1 T (5, 1) T (6, 1) T (5, 2)
s2 T (3, 1) T (3, 2) T (3, 1)
s3 T (4, 1) T (5, 2) T (7, 1)
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Table 2: Payoff matrix of the second example
$˜(i, j) s1 s2 s3
s1 T (3, 2) T (1, 1) T (4, 2)
s2 T (3, 1) T (4, 1) T (3, 2)
s3 T (3, 1.5) T (3, 2) T (6, 2)
$

(2,2) $

(1,1) $

(1,2)
$

(2,1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1
Figure 2: Membership functions of $˜(1, 1), $˜(2, 1), $˜(1, 2) and $˜(2, 2).
In the first example, the degree of resistibility of the strategies against alter-
native strategies are
r12 = 1, r13 = 0.397,
r21 = 0, r23 = 0.034,
r31 = 0.603, r32 = 0.966. (22)
As a result, the fuzzy ESS set is as in equation 23. Hence, according to their
membership, the strategies can be ranked as s3 > s1 > s2.
S˜ =
0.397
s1
+
0
s2
+
0.603
s3
. (23)
Consider the situation in which a population playing strategy s1 is invaded
by a group of mutants playing s2. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the left boundary of
$˜(1, 1) is not smaller than the right boundary of $˜(2, 1), and the left boundary of
$˜(1, 2) is not smaller than the right boundary of $˜(2, 2). According to Equations
20 and 21, the left boundary of (1 − ε) · $˜(1, 1) + ε · $˜(1, 2) is not smaller than
the right boundary of (1− ε) · $˜(2, 1) + ε · $˜(2, 2). That is,
SF (E˜12I (ε) > E˜
12
M (ε)) = 1. (24)
Similarly,
SF (E˜21I (ε) > E˜
21
M (ε)) = 0. (25)
This explains the values of r12 and r21.
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In the second example, the degree of resistibility of the strategies against
alternative strategies are
r12 = 0.222, r13 = 0.295,
r21 = 0.778, r23 = 0.349,
r31 = 0.705, r32 = 0.651. (26)
As a result, the fuzzy ESS set is
S˜ =
0.222
s1
+
0.349
s2
+
0.651
s3
. (27)
According to their membership degree, the strategies can be ranked as s3 >
s2 > s1.
Table 3 summarizes the fuzzy ESS sets and the fuzzy symmetric NE sets
of the two examples. For instance, µNash(s1, s1) = 0.958, µNash(s2, s2) = 0,
µNash(s3, s3) = 0.989 in the first example. It can be seen that a strategy with
a high degree of being an ESS also has a high degree of being a symmetric NE,
while a strategy with a high degree of being a symmetric NE doesn’t necessarily
have a high degree of being an ESS. This comparison result is congruous with
the relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy symmetric NE.
Table 3: Comparison between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy NE
s1 s2 s3
Fuzzy ESS of the first game 0.397 0 0.603
Fuzzy NE of the first game 0.958 0 0.989
Fuzzy ESS of the second game 0.222 0.349 0.651
Fuzzy NE of the second game 0.5 0.854 0.958
4 Discussion and Conclusion
A key concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS). It’s defined by comparison between an incumbent’s expected
payoff and a mutant’s expected payoff. When the payoffs are represented by
fuzzy numbers, the comparison results become vague, so there is no way to
determine whether a strategy is an ESS. Although many works on fuzzy games
have been done, there has been no generalization of ESS into a fuzzy one.
Inspired by the recent work on fuzzy Nash equilibrium [11], this paper proposes
a new approach to evaluate ESS in games with fuzzy payoffs.
In this method, the possibility that an incumbent’s expected payoff is larger
than a mutant’s, is a function of ε¯ (the invasion barrier). This function µij(ε¯)
incorporates the satisfaction function, which is also employed to compare two
fuzzy payoffs in the fuzzification process of NE. Besides µij(ε¯), ε¯ is also an
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indicator of population stability, hence the degree of resistibility of one strategy
against another, denoted as rij , is defined by using fuzzy decision rule on µij(ε¯)
and ε¯. The membership function µS˜(i) is defined as the minimum of rij .
Since we used a similar point of view to fuzzy ESS as in [11] to the concept of
fuzzy NE, the concept of fuzzy ESS has close relation to that of fuzzy NE. Just
like crisp ESS can be considered as a refinement of crisp NE [3], fuzzy ESS can
be considered as a refinement of fuzzy NE. It is worthwhile to note that both
fuzzy NE and fuzzy ESS assign membership to pure strategies. The formaliza-
tions of fuzzy NE and fuzzy ESS concerning mixed strategies are considerably
complicated due to the continuity of mixed strategies.
Also, we address the relation between crisp ESS and fuzzy ESS. Specifically,
what if the proposed approach is applied to crisp payoff games? When the
payoffs are crisp numbers, the expected payoffs of incumbents and mutants are
the following crisp numbers:
EijI (ε) = (1− ε) · $(i, i) + ε · $(i, j), (28)
EijM (ε) = (1− ε) · $(j, i) + ε · $(j, j). (29)
In this regard, the satisfaction function for the comparison of crisp values k and
l is defined as [21]
SF (k > l) =


1, k > l
0.5, k = l
0, k < l
, (30)
SF (k < l) =


1, k < l
0.5, k = l
0, k > l
. (31)
Hence, it is straightforward to verify that rij is equal to the supremum of εij
if εij exists, and is equal to 0.5 if E
ij
I (ε) = E
ij
M (ε) for every ε ∈ (0, 1), and is equal
to 0 in other cases. As an example, consider the Stag Hunt game that describes
a conflict between safety and social cooperation. Two hunters go out on a hunt.
Each can choose to hunt a stag or a hare (represented by strategies G and H
respectively). A hunter who hunts hare obtains a payoff of h > 0. A hunter who
hunts stag obtains a payoff of g > h if the other hunter also hunts stag, and
obtains a payoff of 0 otherwise. Formally, $(H,H) = $(H,G) = h, $(G,G) = g,
and (G,H) = 0. According to the definition of crisp ESS, both G and H are
ESS. By contrast, the fuzzy ESS set for Stag Hunt is
µS˜(H) =
h
g
, (32)
µS˜(G) = 1−
h
g
, (33)
which gives a ranking of these two strategies. When h/g is small and µS˜(G) >
µS˜(H), the hunters tend to cooperate to hunt stag. When h/g becomes larger
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and µS˜(H) > µS˜(G), the hunters tend to hunt hare to avoid the risk of being
betrayed. In general, the membership function of a fuzzy ESS set for strategy
si is reduced to the minimum of the invasion barriers of si against all sj(j 6= i).
In this way the idea of fuzzy ESS can be considered as a natural extension of
the crisp ESS.
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